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"Special bankruptcy legislation for the farmer is hardly new."'
INTRODUCTION
Beginning with the first comprehensive and enduring enactment of
federal bankruptcy law in 1898,2 American bankruptcy law has always paid
special attention to and provided special protection for the American farmer.
The pro-farmer bankruptcy legislation of the Great Depression3 and the
recent Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 19864 are the two most pronounced
examples of this tendency. Bankruptcy is a disorienting socioeconomic
experience for all Americans, but farmers, perhaps more so than any other
recognizable American social group, can think of bankruptcy as a supportive
and sensitive legal process.
Many specialized and specific factors have contributed to bankruptcy
law's approach to farmers over time, but the most general and potent
factor involves the highly valorized image of the farmer in the dominant
American ideology. The term ideology, as employed here, .does not refer
to the capitalist structure of domination frequently stressed in traditional
Marxist scholarship; 5 nor does the term necessarily invoke false, deceptive
* Associate Professor of Law and American Studies, Indiana University
School of Law-Indianapolis. A.B., Harvard College, 1969; J.D., Yale University,
1973; Ph.D. University of Michigan, 1984. The author thanks his research assistant
Barbara M. Richards for her diligent research and valuable insights and his colleague
Paul N. Cox for important conceptual refinements.
1. R. AARON, BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 15-2 (1987).
2. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed as amended 1978).
3. Act of March 3, 1933, ch. 204, § 75, 47 Stat. 1467, 1470-73 (repealed
as amended 1978).
4. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farmers Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-1231 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
5. For explorations of the Marxist understandings of ideology, see R.
EYEPim, FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS AND IDEOLOGY IN MARXIST THEORY (1981) and
Hunt, The Ideology of Law: Advances and Problems in Recent Applications of
the Concept of Ideology to the Analysis of Law, 19 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 11 (1985).
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or negative connotations. 6 Ideology, as employed in this Article, denotes
generalized normative beliefs which are encoded in social institutions and
relations. These normative beliefs are contested and fluid within any par-
ticular historical moment. Ideology also shifts over time in grander ways,
especially as it collides with other ideologies and its social underpinnings
change. Scholars and commentators in legal realism, radical criminology,
sociological jurisprudence, the law and society movement, and-most sig-
nificantly-critical legal studies have demonstrated in various ways that law
interrelates with ideology. 7 Bankruptcy law in general and bankruptcy in-
volving farmers in particular are not exceptions. The pronounced valorizing
of farming in the dominant American ideology most certainly infuses
American bankruptcy law. Farm-related bankruptcy law also, albeit in a
lesser way, contributes to the dominant American ideology.
The ideological tendency to place the American farmer on a pedestal
began even before the founding of the Republic. Drawing on the European
tradition of pastoralism, on the Virgilian image of the good shepherd
reveling in an idealized landscape, American writers and politicians of the
eighteenth century praised the yeoman for his industriousness, honesty,
independence and spirit of equality.' Lost in this imagery was a sense of
how dirty and difficult agricultural labor could be. Nevertheless, in the
Revolutionary Period, prominent figures such as Hugh Henry Brackenridge,
Benjamin Franklin, Phillip Freneau, Thomas Jefferson and George Logan
continued to propagate the American agrarian myth. Perhaps the fullest
statement of the myth came from the French expatriate St. John de
Crevecoeur, writing in his Letters of an American Farmer.9 Cultivation of
the soil, he argued, brought a farmer into harmony with nature while
simultaneously permitting him to avoid the terrible living conditions found
in the pure wilderness. Crevecoeur perceived farming as virtually a utopian
undertaking, an enterprise in which families could grow in deeply human
ways and through which they could serve as the foundation for a larger
6. For a succinct contrast of ideology understood as false versus ideology
understood as merely normative, see R. WiLLIAMS, IYKwoRns: A VOCABULARY OF
CtruRT AND SocinTY 126-30 (1976).
7. Recent articles that use the concept of ideology in ways generally anal-
ogous to this author's include Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American
Law, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1276 (1984); Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study
of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1497 (1983); Weissbourd &
Mertz, Rule-Centrism Versus Legal Creativity: The Skewing of Legal Ideology
Through Language, 19 LAW & Soc'y REv. 623 (1985).
8. Eisinger, The Freehold Concept in Eighteenth-Century American Letters,
4 Wm. & MARY Q. 42 (1947).
9. The original version of Crevecouer's book was published in London in
1782. For discussions of Crevecouer's life and writings, see E. HIGBEE, FARS AND
FARms mN AN URBAN AGE 78-79 (1963) and H. SMTH, Vlano LAND: Tim AmEmicAN
WEST AS SYMBOL AND MYTH 126-28 (1950).
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society.' 0 Even an urban adversary of the agrarian interests such as Alexander
Hamilton showed his obeisance to the agrarian myth. He conceded in his
Report on Manufactures that "the cultivation of the earth, as the primary
and most certain source of national supply, . . . has intrinsically a strong
claim to pre-eminence over every other kind of industry."'"
In the early nineteenth century the agrarian myth hardly disappeared.
Instead, the myth became central in American political folklore and na-
tionalism. In the words of the premier American Studies scholar, Henry
Nash Smith:
The image of this vast and constantly growing agricultural society in the
interiors of the continent became one of the dominant symbols of nine-
teenth-century American society-a collective representation, a poetic idea
that defines the promise of American life. The master symbol of the garden
embraced a cluster of metaphors expressing fecundity, growth, increase
and blissful labor in the earth, all centering about the heroic figure of
the idealized frontier farmer armed with the supreme agrarian weapon,
the sacred plow.' 2
The yeoman became a symbol of the new nation which envisioned the
settling of the trans-Allegheny region, at least outside the South, 3 as an
internal empire of family farms. The Homestead Act of 1862 was further
testimony to this vision,14 and even more so was the manner in which the
agrarian myth rode roughshod over the earliest image of a "Great American
Desert." The premise of an uninhabitable desert to the east of the Rocky
Mountains had been accepted by the American public since at least the
time of Zebulon M. Pike's western expeditions, but the image crumbled
when the frontier of agricultural settlement reached Kansas and Nebraska
shortly before the Civil War. Suddenly, the desert was fertile after all,
and farmers planted stakes, often with disastrous results, across the central
plains. 5
10. For a spirited critique of Crevecouer and related writers, see R. SLOTKIN,
REGENERATION THROUGH VIOLENCE: Tm MYTHOLOGY OF THE AmERicAN FRONTIER,
1600-1860, at 332-48 (1973).
11. R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORm 27 (1955).
12. H. SirriH, supra note 9, at 123.
13. During the first quarter of the nineteenth century, southern agriculture
also expanded rapidly, but in ways quite different than those of the North.
Responding to the world cotton market, southern farmers developed slave-driven
plantations throughout the southern states. While in the North, agrarian ideology
revolved around the myth of the yeoman farmer, the agrarian ideology of the
South stressed the idyllic image of the plantation. The contrast between the two
agrarian ideologies became especially striking during the often bloody battles for
control of the new territories. H. SMrrH, supra note 9, at 145-51.
14. F. SHANNON, THE FARMER'S LAST FRONTIER: AGRICULTURE, 1860-1897,
53-58 (1945).
15. See Gregory, What of the Desert?, 41 CENTURY 796 (1891); Morris, The
Notion of a Great Desert East of the Rockies, 13 Miss. VALLEY HIST. REV. 190
(1926); Smith, Rain Follows the Plow: The Notion of Increased Rainfall for the
Great Plains, 1844-1880, 10 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 169 (1947). For a standard
treatment of pioneers on the plains, see W. WEBB, THE GREAT PLAINS (1931).
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Bankruptcy law during the twentieth century has continued to manifest
this special respect for and sensitivity to farmers. While not limited only
to periods of economic distress, this bankruptcy law tendency is most
evident during economic malfunctions. Bankruptcy as a socioeconomic
phenomenon, of course, is no stranger in these periods, and bankruptcy
law reform in these periods inevitably manifests rhetorical proclivities and,
concomitantly, valorizes the farmer. Supporters of bankruptcy law reform
and the resulting laws themselves selectively emphasize some aspects of
social reality and neglect others; language grows ebullient, expressive and
figurative in support of farmer-oriented schematic renderings of social order.
Pro-farming preferences in the bankruptcy law, however, are not so
powerful and overwhelming as to preclude retrenchment. The selective focus
gives way to what is allegedly more balanced and reasoned; ebullient,
expressive and figurative language is in part supplanted by more moderate
discourse. The bankruptcy law then manifests a skepticism and caution
concerning preferential legal treatment of farmers. In particular, bankruptcy
law attempts to certify that bankrupt farmers are truly farmers and not
sprawling agri-businesses or wealthy individuals seeking tax shelters; it tries
to guaranty that pro-farmer bankruptcy law provisions measure up to general
constitutional standards and also to terminate pro-farmer provisions with
sunset clauses.
This Article explores the rhythm of rhetoric and retrenchment in the
process of American bankruptcy law enactment, adjudication and inter-
pretation. In particular, this Article will consider the prohibition of in-
voluntary farmer bankruptcies in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the attempts
to protect farmers in the Frazier-Lemke Acts of 1934 and 1935, and the
concern for family farmers in the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986.
In sequence, these three developments span almost 100 years and illustrate
a progression from defensive protection to special extensions and moratoria
to an entire bankruptcy chapter. These illustrative developments demonstrate
the interplay of ebullience and moderation within a relatively specific legal-
ideological area. An awareness of what has come before might contribute
to our understanding of what lies ahead in the same area and also contribute
to a greater appreciation of ideology and law's interrelationships in other
areas as well.
A BANKRUPTCY SHIMLD FOR T=E AMERICAN FARMR
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, following several short-lived pieces of
federal bankruptcy legislation, 6 was the first enduring federal bankruptcy
16. Three bankruptcy acts preceded the 1898 legislation. The first was enacted
in 1800 and repealed in 1803. The second was enacted in 1841 and repealed in
1843. The third was enacted in 1867 and repealed in 1878. Each of these acts and
[Vol. 54
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law. 7 The Act's most striking farmer-related feature was a special protection
for farmers against involuntary bankruptcies, 8 a protection not afforded
by the bankruptcy law of 1867.19 No single individual or factor explains
this special protection; rather, a variety of agricultural, political and general
economic developments interacted with the dominant agrarian ideology to
produce the legislative ban on involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against
farmers. The farmer's protection against creditor-initiated bankruptcies,
meanwhile, was tempered when in the years after 1898 federal courts more
carefully and restrictively defined the meaning of "farmer."
Even before the agricultural extension onto the Great Plains in the
years following the Civil War, the American agrarian image which was so
much a part of the dominant ideology, had lost congruence with the realities
of American farming.20 To be sure, the imagery had helped fuel continental
expansion. It also served as a placebo when eastern cities, bulging with
immigrants, were convulsed by rioting. 2' But the imagery notwithstanding,
American farms during the nineteenth century grew larger, more mecha-
nized, and more entrepreneurial. The ranks of "hired hands," that is,
non-proprietary agricultural laborers, increased,22 and farmers found it
increasingly necessary to master railroad shipping rates, complicated loan
agreements, and international commodity markets. More so than ever be-
fore, American farming was a commercial rather than self-sufficient en-
terprise, and the American farmer was frequently a harassed businessman
and speculator.
Certain developments on the federal level reflected an awareness of
these changes. Recognizing commercial farmers' increased need for scientific
expertise and managerial training, Congress in 1889 passed the Hatch Act,
which established a network of agricultural experiment stations. 23 Culmi-
nating an effort that had begun in the antebellum years, 24 President Cleve-
land in February of 1887 elevated the Secretary of Agriculture to cabinet
all subsequent federal bankruptcy legislation as well were enacted under the authority
granted by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. See Hanna, Agriculture and
the Bankruptcy Act, 19 MINN. L. REv. 1, 1-3 (1934); Levinthal, The Early History
of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REv. 223 (1918); Olmstead, Bankruptcy, A
Commercial Regulation, 15 HARv. L. REv. 829 (1902).
17. The legislation was commonly called the Nelson Act.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1898).
19. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed as amended 1978).
20. R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 11, at 36-46.
21. Between 1830 and 1860 alone, thirty-five major riots occurred in Bal-
timore, Philadelphia, New York and Boston. During the same years, Cincinnati
experienced four equally violent riots. D. PAPKE, FAMmwG mE CgnmNimL: CRIME,
Curun. Wojc AND Tr Loss OF CarrIcAL PERSPECTIVE 1830-1900, at 5 (1987).
22. F. SHANNON, supra note 14, at 359-67.
23. R. WEmE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920, at 126 (1967).
24. R. GATES, THm FARMER's AGE: AGRICuLTURE, 1815-1860, at 336-37 (1960).
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rank and named Norman J. Coleman to fill the position. 21 With the federal
government's support, farming continued to grow. During the 1890s the
number of farms increased by one million, the total acreage by two hundred
million, and the total value of farm property by four billion dollars.26
Yet, all was not well in the agricultural sector. Especially in the areas
newly opened to farming, many family farms failed, and mortgages mul-
tiplied far beyond reasonable limits. 27 Regional crop specialization increas-
ingly subordinated farmers to the urban banker and merchant.28 These
socioeconomic phenomena in addition to the dissonance between the image
of philosophical, happy yeoman and the precarious, draining experience
of many farmers contributed to the populist crusades of the 1880s and
1890s. Concluding with the unsuccessful but nevertheless forceful presi-
dential campaign of William Jennings Bryan in 1896, Populism as a political
movement created a new awareness of farmers and their condition, especially
in the South and Midwest. A century earlier, few would have distinguished
farmers from other American citizens, but in the late nineteenth century
occupational and social differentiation continued. Farmers could now be
seen and, indeed, saw themselves as a distinct social group. 29
While farming grew increasingly specialized and precarious, generating
a grumpy political activism, the newly interdependent American economy
suffered between 1893 and 1899 from the nation's worst economic depression
to that point in history. During the first half of 1893, thirty-two steel
companies failed, and in the same year five hundred banks and sixteen
thousand businesses tumbled into insolvency. 0 Nearly twenty percent of
the labor force was unemployed, and in 1894 alone there were over thirteen
hundred strikes and riots.3 Almost as if to underscore the severe economic
disarray, various symbols of the American nation teetered or faced chal-
lenges. President Cleveland struggled to carry on despite mouth cancer,
and Jacob Coxey, a frustrated Ohio businessman, led a ragtag army of
five hundred unemployed workers on a march to Washington, D.C., where
the mounted police clubbed the marchers on the Capitol grounds. Soci-
opolitical disequilibrium was palpable, and highly rhetorical ideological
25. F. SHANNON, supra note 14, at 270-71.
26. H. FAULKNER, PoLrncs, REFORM AND EXPANSION, 1890-1900, at 60 (1959).
27. In 1890, one mortgage existed for every two people in Kansas and North
Dakota and one for every three in Nebraska, South Dakota and Minnesota. J.
HicKs, THE POPULIST REVOLT 24 (1931).
28. F. SHANNON, supra note 14, at 125-267.
29. Important historians return time and again to the question of the Po-
pulists' political identity and program. See, e.g., N. POLLACK, THE JUST POLITY:
POPULISM, LAW AND HUMAN WELFARE (1987); N. POLLACK, THE POPULIST RESPONSE
TO INDusTRIAL AmERICA (1962).
30. 2 M. NORTON, D. KATZMAN, P. EscoTT, H. CHUDACOFF, T. PATERSON
& W. TUTTLE, A PEOPLE AND A NATION 576 (1986).
31. Id. at 577.
[Vol. 54
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expressions both critical and supportive of the American system multiplied.
As in prior less pronounced periods of economic difficulty and ide-
ological uncertainty, Congress began to reform bankruptcy law,32 and in
particular chose to protect that special loam for "grass-roots democracy"-
farmers. The statutory provision protecting farmers from involuntary bank-
ruptcy was a straightforward part of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 3 3 The
new law shielded any person engaged in farming or tillage of the soil from
creditor-initiated bankruptcy, and this basic provision remained unchanged
for forty years.3 4 Even in 1898, the notion of "tillage" carried archaic
connotations, but connotations of this sort linked nicely to traditional
images of yeomanry. A ban on involuntary farmer bankruptcies could not
prevent farmers from overextending themselves financially and from be-
coming insolvent, but due to the provision farmers could only by their
own volition enter into bankruptcy proceedings. This special group of
Americans was to have its integrity, dignity and independence preserved
even in the midst of bankruptcy, the darkest moment of American economic
life.
A treatise literature on the new bankruptcy law appeared almost as
soon as the law itself, but the literature hardly mentioned the unique farmer
provision. Henry Campbell Black, for example, who was destined to win
the race for prominence among compilers of legal dictionaries, produced
a bankruptcy treatise in 1898. 35 The treatise provided extensive annotations
for "wage earner" and other phrases, and it reflected almost dejectedly
on the Bankruptcy Act's failure: "It may be expected that difficulties will
arise in [the Act's] construction, in view of the complex conditions of
modern business life and the manifold nature of the relation of employer
and employed.''36 Yet, the volume merely restated, without significant
32. The bankruptcy law enacted in 1800, Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2
Stat. 19 (repealed as amended 1978), followed the depression of 1798, and the law
of 1841 followed the severe banking crisis of 1837. The Bankruptcy Act of 1867,
ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed as amended 1978), was enacted in the midst of the
severe economic disarray following the Civil War.
33. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 46, 30 Stat. 544, 547 (repealed as
amended 1978), provided at the time of its 1898 enactment:
Any natural person, except a wage earner or a person engaged chiefly in
farming or the tillage of the soil, any unincorporated company, and any
corporation engaged principally in manufacturing, trading, printing, pub-
lishing, or mercantile pursuits, owing debts to the amount of one thousand
dollars or over, may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt upon default
or an impartial trial, and shall be subject to the provisions and entitled
to the benefits of this Act. Private bankers, but not national banks or
banks incorporated under State or Territorial laws, may be adjudged
involuntary bankrupts.
34. In the Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1(17), 52 Stat. 840, 841 (repealed
as amended), Congress more extensively defined "farmer" for bankruptcy purposes.
35. H. BLACK, A HANDBOOK OF BANKRUPTCY (1898).
36. Id. at 35-36.
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discussion, the farmer provision. 7 For his part, William Miller Collier,
who would claim his mantel as the nation's premier bankruptcy law com-
mentator, warned in the preface to his treatise that the new law would
be "a matter of statutory construction" and promised to provide and
construe "copious cross-references. 3 8 True to his promise, Collier went
on to discuss virtually every key word in the involuntary bankruptcy section,
only to leave unaddressed the definition of farmer.3 9 Turn-of-the-century
farmers were increasingly becoming specialized businessmen; they were, like
classic small businessmen, diversifying their economic pursuits. Yet, the
first treatise writers took little notice. Farmers were farmers. While the
treatises explored complexities in many other areas, their fix on the yeoman
was naively steady.
The federal courts, meanwhile, found living annotations to the treatises
gathering on the courthouse steps. In one representative case, a South
Carolinian sought to avoid an involuntary proceeding because of his farmer
status. He cultivated 630 acres of cotton, bought and sold mules, and was
also a partner in a buggy and wagon dealership. 40 The appellate court held
that farming was the bankrupt's chief business; however, the Columbus
Buggy Company which had initiated the involuntary proceeding could
justifiably have questioned the ruling. In another case, the alleged bankrupt
not only ran three country stores but also was a member of four distinct
partnerships each of which cultivated a separate farm.4' What for purposes
of bankruptcy law were the defining characteristics of a farmer? Who
really was a farmer? The questions were difficult to answer, if only because
economic activity in the agricultural sector did not lend itself to simple
characterizations.
Traversing a largely unmarked course, courts had no reliable legal
standards to guide them, and general sentiments and bridled skepticism
were influential in their decisions. Some decisions appeared to rest largely
on the courts' perceptions of genuine agrarian histories or sensitivities on
the bankrupt's part. If the bankrupt and his family had a history of farming
or if he appreciated farming and held it close to his heart, then he could
claim protection from an involuntary proceeding.
Note in this regard both Sutherland v. Rich & Bailey4 and In re Hoy.43
In the former, a Georgian referee seemed particularly impressed that a
supposed farmer grew up on a nearby farm and knew how to assess the
37. Id. at 25.
38. W. COLLIER, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY AND THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY
ACT OF 1898, at iv (1898).
39. Id. at 51-56.
40. Counts v. Columbus Buggy Co., 210 F. 748 (4th Cir. 1913).
41. American Agric. Chem. Co. v. Brinkley, 194 F. 411 (4th Cir. 1912).
42. 22 Am. Bankr. Rpts. 85 (1909).
43. 137 F. 175 (N.D. Iowa 1905).
[Vol. 54
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 4 [1989], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/2
RHETORIC AND RETRENCHMENT
levelness of a certain plot. To be sure, the man and his partner also rented
the plot to "fifteen colored families," ran a commissary at which the
tenants shopped with trade checks, sold fertilizer and John Deere plows,
and in the partner's case served as the local justice of the peace. Yet when
a cyclone blew through the county scattering the goods, trade checks and
fertilizer and demolishing the commissary itself, the referee determined that
the partners were farmers and dismissed the involuntary bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. In In re Hoy, the bankrupt, William Hoy, had grown up on an
Iowa farm, taught school for a number of years, read law, and then
conducted a legal practice and collections business in Mason City. Hoy
owned five rental farms, and paid particular attention to the 470-acre farm
on which his brother-in-law was the tenant. They co-stocked the farm,
Hoy participated in management decisions, and Hoy himself lived on the
farm. The district court judge tried to unravel the financial affairs of this
prototypical Midwestern agrarian entrepreneur and professional to determine
if his creditors could force Hoy into an involuntary bankruptcy. Acknowl-
edging the difficulty of his task, Judge Reed referred to the ledger sheets
and determined that the costs and benefits of Hoy's farms exceeded the
comparable figures for Hoy's professional and collections activities. Hoy
was, therefore, for bankruptcy purposes, adjudged a farmer. If any doubts
lingered about the bankrupt's competing affiliation with the legal profession,
the court noted, "He has not kept up his library for some two or three
years, has only partial sets of the Iowa Reports, the Northwestern and
Northeastern Reporters, and about 25 volumes of miscellaneous text-books,
and has offered these for sale prior to 1903." 44
Impressionistic decisions of this sort might suggest a judicial inclination
to accept claims of farming status, but there was also detectable judicial
skepticism. Beyond an awareness that American farming was an increasingly
complex and sophisticated business, judges likely appreciated the real im-
provements in the farm economy that began roughly in 1897 and continued
until World War I4 This prosperity may have contributed to a judicial
inclination to limit the definition of "farmer" within the bankruptcy laws,
and thereby to prevent overutilization of the protection from involuntary
bankruptcy proceedings.
Countless decisions betray a recognizable skepticism as the new century
began to unfold. One court prevented an individual who had become
insolvent while conducting a boot and shoe business from then fleeing into
the safe harbor of farming.46 Another court held that ownership of a
residence on a farm leased to another was insufficient to protect one from
44. Id. at 177-78.
45. H. FAuLKNER, supra note 26, at 61; R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 11, at
95; F. SHANNON, ArsamcAN FARMERs' MOVEMENTs 74-75 (1957).
46. In re Luckhardt, 101 F. 807, 809-10 (D. Kan. 1900).
1989]
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involuntary bankruptcy.4 7 Still another court distinguished between an agrar-
ian farmer on the one hand and a person who bought and sold cattle on
the other.48 Finally, one court held that the conveyance of a farm to a
wife who was not truly engaged in farming was insufficient to protect the
farm property from the creditors' grasp in an involuntary proceeding.49 To
be sure, many of those who claimed farmer status to avoid creditor-initiated
bankruptcies successfully sustained their claims, but generally speaking, the
simplicity of the initial legislative provision was moderated by both im-
pressionistic searching and especially by a cautious skepticism.
At the least, the federal courts established general parameters. On one
extreme, agricultural corporations were not deemed farmers, 0 and, on the
other, an individual bankrupt's lack of affiliation with any other business
or occupation did not mean he was by default a farmer. 1 But, disdain
for corporations and the acknowledgment that the turn-of-the-century Amer-
ican everyman was not automatically a farmer hardly established anything
approaching firm rules. As the court stated in Bank of Dearborn v. Matney,52
there was "no hard and fast rule. ' '5 3 While several United States Circuit
Courts addressed the question of the definition of a farmer under the
bankruptcy law,54 the United States Supreme Court did not consider the
definition and left determinations on the myriad of hybrid cases to local
judges. The case law considered the sources of indebtedness5 and struggled
genuinely and, on occasion, disingenuously to determine if farming was
of "paramount importance" to a debtor's welfare,56 but clear standards
failed to emerge. While a judicial consensus that the question of farming
status had to be considered eventually emerged, judges in the first decade
of the twentieth century appeared faithful to ideological premises of the
1898 Bankruptcy Act. While propagating a judicial retrenchment from the
legislative rhetoric, the judges themselves referred to an ideological image
of the yeoman and attempted to gauge the highly variable and decidedly
47. In re Matson, 123 F. 743, 743-44 (M.D. Penn. 1903).
48. In re Brown, 132 F. 706, 707 (S.D. Iowa 1904).
49. In re Johnson, 149 F. 864, 869 (N.D.N.Y. 1907).
50. In re Lake Jackson Sugar Co., 129 F. 640, 643 (S.D. Tex. 1904).
51. In re Leland, 185 F. 830, 832 (W.D. Mich. 1910).
52. 132 F. 75 (W.D. Mo. 1904).
53. Id. at 77.
54. Counts v. Columbus Buggy Co., 210 F. 748 (4th Cir. 1913). See also
Olive v. Armour & Co., 167 F. 517 (5th Cir. 1909); Gregg v. Mitchell, 166 F.
725 (6th Cir. 1909); Flickinger v. First Nat'l Bank, 145 F. 162 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 203 U.S. 595 (1906); Beach v. Macon Grocery Co., 120 F. 736 (5th Cir.
1903); Wulbern v. Drake, 120 F. 493 (4th Cir. 1903); In re Dwyer, 184 F. 880
(7th Cir. 1901).
55. In re Brown, 132 F. 706 (S.D. Iowa 1904); Bank of Dearborn v. Matney,
132 F. 75 (W.D. Mo. 1904).
56. In re Mackey, 110 F. 355, 359 (D. Del. 1901).
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more commercial realities of American agriculture against this image qua
standard.
A commentator on the question of who was a farmer for purposes of
twentieth-century bankruptcy law need not narrow his or her focus to pre-
World War I cases. Indeed, there is an abundance of cases revolving around
this question from later periods.5 7 However, the treatment at hand suggests
the variable interactions of agrarianism and American bankruptcy law.
Working in a period of sociopolitical disequilibrium, Congress enacted a
comprehensive bankruptcy law which shielded farmers from involuntary
bankruptcy proceedings. The pro-farming provision respected the increas-
ingly precarious position of farmers in the interdependent economy, and
it also reiterated a traditional ideological premise in a time of national
uncertainty. After the legislative overture, a modulating cacophony became
audible, one which echoed not the initial flourish but rather the variegated
sounds of economic diversity, specialization and hybridization. Ideology
and law are never separate and distinct, but as subsequent discussions will
further confirm, the actual interrelationship of ideology and law is hardly
static. In bankruptcy law initial pronouncements may be perceived as one-
half of a dialectic with more quotidian sociolegal tinkering.
FARMER BANKRUPTCY IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION
The Great Depression came early to American farms. For most sectors
of the economy, the stock market crash of 1929 marked the beginning of
severe economic decline, but American agriculture never emerged from the
economic downturn of the early 1920s. Farm prices fell throughout the
decade, and by 1929 the per capita income of American farmers was only
thirty-six percent of that for all Americans.5 1 Farmers' difficulties derived
from many factors, not the least of which was chronic overproduction.
Mechanization and specialization contributed to this overproduction, and,
as the tractor replaced the horse and mule, farmers were able to cultivate
land that formerly had been pasture. In addition, farmers had greatly
increased their debt burdens starting with the prosperity of the war years
and continuing into the agricultural depression of the 1920s; thus, mortgage
foreclosure became common when prices fell and international markets
were unable to absorb American agricultural surpluses. 59
When the Great Depression began in force, conditions in the agricultural
sector grew even worse. On a single day in April of 1932, one-fourth of
57. To cite one basis for research in a later period, see I H. REMINGTON,
A TREATISE ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 68 (1950), which
contains six full pages of case annotations concerning who may qualify as a farmer.
58. R. McELvANE, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: AMERCA, 1929-1941, at 21
(1984).
59. Id. at 35-36.
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all the land in Mississippi was sold at foreclosure auctions.6° In some areas
farmers took direct action, refusing to grow or ship crops, menacing judges,
and holding foreclosure bidding to a pittance. "Penny auctions" and other
forms of resistance never became common, but they in part prompted
quick action from the newly installed Roosevelt Administration. The Ag-
ricultural Adjustment Act, Emergency Farm Mortgage Act, and other pieces
of federal legislation followed. 61 Certain members of the Congress, in fact,
favored greater reforms than the Roosevelt Administration. One proposal
surfaced to have the government issue three billion dollars in fiat money
to buy farm mortgages, a proposal which one legal commentator found
truly ominous. 62 This proposal failed to attract supporters in Congress, but
throughout the 1930s farmers were the Great Depression's greatest victims.
Envisioned schematically, the sad and unfortunate plight of American
farmers during the 1920s and 1930s was an especially dark circle in a large
field which was already black.
In Congress, changes in bankruptcy laws emerged as one remedy for
farmers. On the simplest level, many farmers were facing insolvency and
consequently the loss of their family farms. Hence, lawmakers could un-
derstandably have hoped to alleviate farmers' distress and preserve their
dignity by reforming bankruptcy law. More generally, however, the nation
as a whole was under stress; options and directions were uncertain. In a
situation such as this, there was a tendency to refer to traditional ideological
preferences for guidance. To wit, the valorization of farming-the tendency
to treat farmers as veritable icons of Americanism-provided some ori-
entation. In the bankruptcy area as in others, protecting farmers through
law reform symbolically and psycho-politically protected America. However,
after ebullient and expressive rhetoric in Congress led to pronounced pro-
farmer enactments, the United States Supreme Court and lower courts took
upon themselves the task of moderating and redirecting these highly im-
passioned legislative initiatives. Congress in turn responded to the Supreme
Court, and the dialectic of rhetoric and retrenchment resulted in much
more limited legislative action.
Congress' Depression-era bankruptcy legislation involving farmers was
section 75 of the Bankruptcy Code. 63 Enacted in 1933, section 75 expanded
troubled farmers' opportunities to rehabilitate through composition and
extension agreements. This reform met with little success, however, since
under the original terms of section 75 farmers' creditors maintained the
60. W. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. RoosEvELT AND TE NE w DEAL, 1932-
1940, at 23 (1963).
61. M. BENEDICT, FAgM PoLIcEs oF r UNITED STATES, 1790-1950: A STUDY
OF TBEm ORIGINs AND DEVELOPMENTS 276-401 (1953).
62. Hanna, supra note 16, at 7.
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power to approve or disapprove proposed compositions or extensions. If
the creditors did not approve, the farmer still faced liquidation. The best
indicator of the law's limited impact is that during the eight months
following its enactment only forty debtors in the country filed petitions
under section 75.64
Because of the failure of section 75, Lynn Frazier and William Lemke
introduced a bill to amend section 75. Because the bill granted farmers
more extended foreclosure moratoria, it was an even more pronounced
pro-farmer gesture. The Frazier-Lemke Act may be viewed as a product
of the Northern Plains and of the particularly depressed condition of grain
farmers of that region. Frazier and Lemke were veterans of the rambunctious
Nonpartisan League campaigns of the 1920s and, respectively, Senator and
Congressman from North Dakota.65 Lemke rode promises of mortgage and
bankruptcy law reform for farmers into office in 1932, and the Frazier-
Lemke Act was one of his attempts to deliver on his campaign promises.
Certain eastern senators vigorously opposed the Act, 66 but Senator Huey
Long, his own populist colors waving, successfully maneuvered the bill
through the Senate and through conference. Although the Roosevelt Ad-
ministration did nothing to block the legislation, 67 there was discomfort in
liberal and urbane New Deal circles with Lemke's more aggressive and
agrarian politics. Lemke eventually undertook a national speaking tour
attacking the New Deal, and he became a favorite of militant anti-Roosevelt
groups. Nominated by the newly-organized Union Party, Lemke ran for
President in 1936, receiving almost 900,000 votes in an ill-fated third-party
campaign. 61
The Frazier-Lemke Act itself was a bold attempt to save the farms of
bankrupt farmers. The Act provided, among other things, that a farmer
who failed to receive creditor consent for a composition under the Bank-
ruptcy Act could, nevertheless, upon being adjudged a bankrupt, take other
steps to save his mortgaged property. The bankrupt farmer could, if the
mortgagee assented, purchase the farm at appraised value, acquiring title
64. Hanna, supra note 16, at 6.
65. T. SALOUTOS & J. HIcKs, TWENTIETH-CENTURY PoPULIsM: AGRicuLTuRAL
DIscoNTENT IN THE MIDDLE WEST, 1900-1939, at 149-218 (1951).
66. Senator Herbert of Rhode Island and Senator Lonergan of Connecticut
were especially outspoken critics of the Act. Senator Lonergan deplored the Act
for its "repudiation of obligations" and "taking property without due process of
law." "I am satisfied as a lawyer," Lonegran added, "that there is not any court
in the land that would uphold this bill if it should be enacted as law." See Hanna,
supra note 16, at 8 (quoting Senator Lonergan).
67. When signing the Frazier-Lemke Act into law ten days after Congress
adjourned in 1934, President Roosevelt characterized it as "loosely drawn." N.Y.
Times, May 28, 1935, at 1, col. 7. However, he did defend the Act by saying,
"I have sufficient faith in the honesty of the overwhelming majority of farmers
to believe that they will not evade payment of just debts." Id.
68. W. LEUCHTENB RG, supra note 60, at 195.
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and immediate possession by agreeing to make deferred payments at modest
interest rates.69 If the mortgagee refused to assent to the purchase on these
terms, the bankrupt farmer could ask the court to stay all proceedings for
five years. During that period the farmer could retain possession by paying
a reasonable rental fee which would be distributed periodically among
secured and unsecured interests. At any point during the five years, the
farmer could acquire the farm by paying the appraised price in full.70
Real estate lenders greeted the Act with dismay, but distressed farmers
were delighted. Self-styled spokesmen for the latter were especially prone
to the highly figurative and emphatic language which is evident in periods
of social strain. Congressman Charles U. Truax showed a special knack
for rhetorical invective. Vigorously supporting the Frazier-Lemke Act, Truax
said:
When this law becomes effective, I can but wonder what will become of
the ruthless money lender when the breath of gold leaves his feculent body
and a financial death stops the rattling of his grasping brain, for he is
unfit for the higher realm of life and too foul for the one below. He
cannot be buried in the earth, lest he provoke a pestilence; nor in the
sea, lest he poison the fish; nor waving in space like Mahomet's coffin,
lest the circling worlds, in trying to avoid contamination, crash together,
wreck the universe and bring again the noisome reign of chaos and Satan.'.
Within a year, a test case was argued before the Supreme Court of
the United States. The case revolved around the Radfords, a farming couple
from Kentucky who had defaulted on their mortgages to the Louisville
Joint Stock Land Bank. The latter commenced a suit in the Christian
County Circuit Court to foreclose the mortgage. The Radfords then at-
tempted to obtain the approval of creditors for a composition, but the
requisite number failed to assent. Only the passage of the Frazier-Lemke
Act two days prior to the Court's order enabled the Radfords to continue
attempts to save their farm. The Radfords filed amended petitions and
obtained a five-year stay from the bankruptcy referee.
After approval of the referee's order by the federal district court 2 and
an affirmation of the district court's decree by the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, 73 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Any assumption that the case concerned only a farming couple from
Kentucky evaporated in view of the luminaries who wrote briefs and made
oral arguments. John W. Davis, among others, was on brief for the
petitioners. The Democratic Party's Presidential nominee in 1924, Davis
69. Act of June 28, 1934, ch. 869, § 75(s)(3), 48 Stat. 1289, 1290 (repealed
as amended 1978).
70. Id. § 75(s)(7), at 1291.
71. 78 CONG. REc. 11,923 (1933) (statement of Representative Truax).
72. In re Radford, 8 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Ky. 1934).
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was a Wall Street lawyer who headed the prestigious Davis, Polk & Wardwell
firm. His clients included J. P. Morgan and Standard Oil, and in the
1920s he earned over $400,000 annually, at that point a virtually unheard
of income for an attorney. 74 During the 1930s, Davis became a member
of the National Lawyers' Committee of the American Liberty League, a
fierce anti-New Deal group whose "assault against the administration was
prompted by political opposition reinforced by professional displacement. "75
In keeping with his conservative and even reactionary political leanings,
Davis argued that the Frazier-Lemke Act was outside the realm of bank-
ruptcy and deprived mortgagees of their property rights without due process.
Elaborately outlined and professionally composed, Davis' brief bemoaned
the trampling of mortgagees' rights and even included a lengthy appendix
providing the full range of state mortgage moratorium laws.
7 6
Combinations of private lawyers, the Attorneys General of Minnesota
and North Dakota, and none other than William Lemke acting as Special
Assistant Attorney General of North Dakota submitted a half dozen briefs
for the Radfords. Lemke was not Davis' equal in professionalism and legal
argument, but Lemke's images of noble farmers were bolder and more
graphic than those Davis could craft for secured creditors. Lemke deplored
Davis for contending that Congress "cannot extend to a class of citizens
who formed the Republic, defended it, and for a century and a half have
been regarded as its backbone, the right at this time, to so reorganize their
financial affairs that they may remain as the dependable, stable and con-
servative bulwark of the nation." 77 Bursting with rhetorical vigor, Lemke
went on to add that the situation prior to the enactment of the Frazier-
Lemke Act "tended to convert our home owning farmers into mere tenants
and homeless, impoverished citizens." ' 78 Only the Act saved the farmer
"from being reduced to a beggar, a mendicant, a mere homeless man in
search of home and a place to rent at the mercy of his landlord.
'79
Given this aggressive juxtaposition of positive and negative references
and the unusually contentious character of the advocates and briefs on
both sides of the case, it is hardly surprising that the actual oral argument
was a rough-and-tumble affair. Edwin A. Krauthoff's arguments for the
Radfords, stating that the banking system was a "favorite child of the
law" and a "device to enable men with capital to lend money to farmers
without paying an income tax," elicited sharp rebuke from Justice
74. J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MOD-
ERN AERIcA 136-43 (1976).
75. Id. at 193.
76. Brief of Petitioner at 4, Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,
295 U.S. 555 (1935), in 295 RECORDS AND BRIEFS OF CASES DECIDED BY SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 495-632 (1935).
77. Id.
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McReynolds, one of the Court's most conservative members.80 Krauthoff
apologized, but insisted there was a question "whether bankers shall be
allowed to dispossess farmers and make them peasants and tenants."',
Surprisingly, the Radford case did not produce fractious discord among
the members of the United States Supreme Court. In a unanimous opinion
handled down on May 27, 1935, the Court declared the Frazier-Lemke Act
unconstitutional. 82 While another unanimous decision of the same day which
struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act83 overshadowed it, the
ruling in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford was nonetheless
forceful. As if to underscore the Court's unanimity, Justice Brandeis, one
of the most recognizable "liberals" on the Court and a man with a
demonstrated sympathy for the underdog and common man,84 authored
the opinion.
As a legal-cultural artifact, Brandeis' opinion is a mixed bag full of
curious and misleading items. The opinion, for example, consists of seven
sequentially ordered sections, but on closer examination the sections lack
substantive distinctiveness. The opinion includes an elaborately crafted his-
torical summary of legislation protecting "necessitous mortgagors" and
narrower exploration of American bankruptcy legislation, which concludes
that the Frazier-Lemke Act was sui generis.85 But then, with the opinion
apparently building toward the conclusion that the Act exceeded the Con-
gressional power in the bankruptcy area, Brandeis switched to other topics.
In its final pages, the opinion even includes an unanticipated and largely
quantitative disquisition on the social phenomenon of farm tenancies,8 6 a
disquisition reminiscent of the fabled "Brandeis brief" but designed in the
case at hand to counter impassioned suggestions by the Radfords' counsel
that American farmers were becoming peasants.
The charitable critic might credit Brandeis with an erudite thoroughness
or, perhaps, a misdirecting caginess, but it is more likely that a hurried
Justice in the swirl of the Great Depression had difficulty focusing sharply.
Disregarding the various curiosities in the opinion, the heart of the matter
was that Brandeis and the Court felt that Congress had gone too far in
attempting to aid farmers. The issue was not Congressional authority under
the bankruptcy clause but rather the manner in which Congress exercised
80. N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1935, at 11, col. 3.
81. Id.
82. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
83. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 553 (1935).
84. President Roosevelt counted Justices Brandeis, Cardozo and Stone as
his most reliable allies on the Court. When he learned that Brandeis had joined
the majority in invalidating the National Industrial Relations Act in Schechter
Poultry, Roosevelt blurted, "And what about old Isaiah?" (Brandeis' friends called
him Isaiah.). E. GERHART, AMERIcA's ADvOcATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON 99 (1958).
85. Radford, 295 U.S. at 581-86.
86. Id. at 599-601.
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its power. The "avowed object" of the Act, Brandeis said, was "to take
from the mortgagee rights in the specific property held as security.''87 Did
the Act go too far in taking property rights without compensation? Speaking
for a unanimous Court, Brandeis concluded that it had. The Act's unraveling
of the mortgagee's bundle of property rights was a violation of the fifth
amendment and therefore void. 8
While law journal editors hurriedly published articles analyzing and
interpreting Radford into print,8 9 Frazier and Lemke apparently had little
difficulty grasping what had troubled the Court. Congress, in the Court's
opinion, had been too exuberant and reckless; doctrinal refinements and
fifth amendment proscriptions notwithstanding, the Court wanted Congress
to moderate its agrarianism. Frazier and Lemke abided. They carefully
redrafted their act and again shepherded it through Congress. The Frazier-
Lemke Act II went before both Judiciary Committees, which in turn relied
on subcommittees to gauge the compliance of the new act with Radford.
After amendments were added by the subcommittees, the revised bill went
before the committees of the House and the Senate and then to both
chambers in which it passed without a single dissent. The reenactment of
the Act was so rapid as to leave observers' heads spinning, but the resulting
legislation was highly sensitive to the reservations which Brandeis and the
Court had expressed just three months earlierY° In particular, the Frazier-
Lemke Act II provided for (1) the unqualified retention of the mortgagee's
lien with reference to appraised value, (2) a public sale at the request of
the mortgagee, and (3) an unqualified right of the mortgagee to bid at
the sale.9' Pro-farmer rhetoric gave way to moderation, as Frazier, Lemke,
and the Congress in general strove visibly for a piece of bankruptcy
legislature that could pass constitutional muster.92
As was the case with the original Frazier-Lemke Act, cases challenging
the legislation sprouted like weeds in the farmer's field. Results in the
circuit courts conflicted, 93 and the Supreme Court quickly granted certiorari
87. Id. at 594.
88. Id. at 602.
89. Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process Clause-Frazier-Lemke Act:
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 15 B.U.L. Rnv. 818 (1935); Case
Comment, Constitutional Law-Fifth Amendment-Invalidity of Frazier-Lemke
Amendment to the Bankruptcy Act, 35 CoLum. L. REv. 1136 (1935); Note, Bank-
ruptcy-Constitutional Law-Mortgages, 10 ST. Jon's L. REv. 111 (1935).
90. Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U.S. 440, 458 (1937).
91. Act of August 28, 1935, ch. 792, § 75(s)(1)-(6), 49 Stat. 942, 943-45
(repealed as amended 1978).
92. See 79 CONG. REc. 13,413, 13,633-34, 13,641-42 (1935) (statements of
Senators Ashhurst, Borah and Frazier).
93. The Seventh and Eighth Circuits held the Frazier-Lemke Act II invalid
in, respectively, Lafayette Life Insurance Co. v. Lowmon, 79 F.2d 887 (7th Cir.
1935), and United States National Bank v. Pamp, 83 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1936),
but the Fifth Circuit found the Act valid in Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Davis, 83 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1936).
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to a Virginia case to resolve the conflicts and to determine if the Frazier-
Lemke Act II was constitutional. Robert Wright, a farmer from Bedford
County, Virginia, had proceeded under the Frazier-Lemke Act II. His
petition was dismissed in the lower court, and the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.94 Brandeis again wrote for
the unanimous Court in his distinctive style, but this time with assorted
Court-packing plans in the wind. 9 The Court held that the pro-farmer
bankruptcy legislation was constitutionally valid. 96 Yes, Brandeis acknowl-
edged, there was some impairment of the mortgagee's property rights under
the new legislation, but the central legal question was whether the legislation
affected the mortgagee's right "to such an extent as to deny the due process
of law guaranteed by the fifth amendment." ' 97 The amended legislation in
his opinion created no unreasonable modification of the mortgagee's right
and was therefore valid.98 Three years later Justice Douglas, writing for a
unanimous Court, not only reiterated Brandeis' general holding but also,
in effect, resolved specific lingering ambiguities in the farmers' favor.99
Did the Frazier-Lemke Act II prove a savior for American farmers?
Did it to any significant extent save the family farm? Two scholars launched
an ambitious quantitative study in hopes of answering those questions,110
but a new agricultural prosperity deriving from the United States' entry
into World War II made any definitive appraisal of the legislation's impact
impossible. However, the question in interest relates not to social impact,
but rather to the ebb and flow of agrarian rhetoric in American bankruptcy
law. A full generation after assorted courts attempted to determine who
fit the definition of a farmer for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
frequent and extensive litigation concerning farmer bankruptcy again con-
vulsed the federal courts. The specific focal concern had changed and
indeed grown more troubling from the farmers' perspective. The question
was no longer immunity from involuntary bankruptcy but rather concerted
emergency efforts to save the family farm. Yet, in both periods a pattern
of rhetoric and retrenchment emerged. Imbued with pro-agrarian ideology,
legislators vigorously valorized the American farmer in the context of the
bankruptcy law only to see more cautious courts prompt legal rollbacks.
94. Wright v. Vinton Branch, 85 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1936), rev'd, 300 U.S.
440 (1937).
95. LEucHTENBuRG, supra note 60, at 231-38.
96. Wright, 300 U.S. at 470.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273 (1940). The case
involved the same bankrupt farmer.
100. J. MUNGER & E. FEDER, TA FRAZIER-LEMKE ACT: ITS IMPACT ON
FARMERS AND LENDERS (1957).
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A NEw CHAPTER iN FARmER BANKRUPTCY LAw
Between the expiration of the Frazier-Lemke Act II and the present,101
Congress undertook the most extensive revision of bankruptcy law in
American history.'0 2 The revision maintained the ban on involuntary pro-
ceedings against farmers' 3 and ultimately gave certain farmers new standing
in the distribution of the assets of a liquidated estate.' °4 However, in the
opinion of most, the Bankruptcy Reform Act was woefully inadequate for
the agricultural crisis of the 1980s.'0 5 In the midst of this crisis, friends
of the farmer prompted Congress not merely to provide special protections
for the financially troubled farmer but also to enact an entire bankruptcy
chapter aimed at farmers.'06 This extraordinary legislative action would
have been impossible without the continuing vitality of American agrarian
ideology, but the pattern of rhetoric and retrenchment also reappears.
Indeed, Chapter 12 itself incorporated from the start certain of the modified
definitions and stances which came about after the enactments of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the original Frazier-Lemke Act. In addition,
the courts have begun interpreting Chapter 12 in ways which show a caution
regarding farmer bankruptcy. Is Chapter 12 a genuine and valuable attempt
to save the family farm? To save the farmer's image? To save a national
premise? A familiarity with the history of American agrarian ideology's
interrelations with bankruptcy law prompts affirmative answers to all these
questions.
The crisis in American agriculture during the 1980s, like the agricultural
crisis which began in the 1920s and continued through the Great Depression,
did not spring from a single source. Beyond endemic worries about weather
conditions, American farmers during the 1980s faced a two-headed monster
of higher production costs and lower commodity prices caused by the 1980
101. Due to various extensions, the Frazier-Lemke Act II, originally scheduled
to terminate in 1944, remained operative until 1949. Anderson & Rainach, Farm
Reorganization Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 28 Loy. L. Rav. 439 (1982).
102. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1320 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
103. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
104. Farmers encountered problems with failing grain elevators in the late
1970s and early 1980s. As a result, Congress in 1984 gave grain farmers a new
priority in the distribution stage of a bankruptcy proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(5)(A)
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). For discussions of farmers' problems with grain elevators,
see Culhane, And When She Got There, The Cupboard Was Bare: The Producer's
Plight in Grain Warehouse Insolvency, 17 CREIGrON L. Rav. 699 (1984) and
Dewey, Grain Elevator Bankruptcies, 30 S.D.L. REv. 326 (1985).
105. See Anderson & Rainach, supra note 101.
106. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farmers Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-1231 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
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grain embargo and several consecutive years of unusually large harvests."0
Even more importantly for bankruptcy filing purposes, the value of farmland
began to plummet in 1981. This drop came immediately after a period
during which the value of farm land rose rapidly and many speculative
farmers borrowed heavily against their land in order to expand. The sudden
turnaround left many farmers with a highly unfavorable debt/asset ratio
and actual or de facto insolvency.108 According to one commentator, one-
third of all American farms were in severe economic distress by 1985.109
With a high number of mortgage foreclosures "a state of emergency for
farmers" existed;' 1° farmers stood at "the edge of a financial cliff.""'
As it had previously in American history, the image of farmers in
trouble tugged on American heartstrings. In 1985, for example, Willie
Nelson and a group of popular singers organized a twelve-hour "Farm
Aid" concert to benefit farmers.12 Illinois Governor Jim Thompson vol-
unteered the University of Illinois football stadium as a concert venue,
and 78,000 tickets sold out in two days. Admittedly, the amount raised
by the concert could barely satisfy one day's interest on farmers' collective
debt, but the power of agrarianism as an American ideological strain
manifested itself again. The members of Congress, one hopes less naively,
felt similar ideological tugs. and, as in the past, bankruptcy law emerged
as one potential reform to help farmers.
To be sure, options for insolvent farmers were already available within
the existing bankruptcy law, but each of these options was far less than
ideal. Under Chapter 7, the liquidation chapter, a bankrupt farmer could
obtain the much valued "fresh start," but he or she would have to allow
foreclosure of the farm mortgage."' Bankruptcy at the expense of losing
the family farm was hardly desirable. Alternatively, the farmer could have
turned to Chapter 13,"1 the reorganization chapter for individuals with
regular income, but, strange as it may have seemed to a turn-of-the-century
farmer like William Hoy or to the Depression-era Radfords, most con-
107. See Harl, The Architecture of Public Policy: The Crisis in Agriculture,
34 U. KAN. L. REv. 425 (1986); Massey, Farmers in Crisis: A Challenge to Legal
Services, 18 CLEAINGHOUSE REV. 702 (1984).
108. Flaccus & Dixon, The New Bankruptcy Chapter 12: A Computer Analysis
of If and When a Farmer Can Successfully Reorganize, 41 ARK. L. REv. 263,
263-64 (1988).
109. Kotis, Chapter 13 and the Family Farm, 3 BANxRa. DEv. J. 599, 599
(1986).
110. Comment, Bankruptcy: Can It Save the Family Farm?, 11 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 1019, 1019 (1985).
111. Ryan, The Changing Standards of Adequate Protection in Farm Bank-
ruptcy Reorganizations, 37 DRAKE L. REv. 323, 323 (1987-88).
112. Harvest Song-Willie Plans a Benefit, TniE, Sept. 23, 1985, at 32;
McCormick, Next: We Are the Farm, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 23, 1985, at 33.
113. 11 U.S.C. § 701-766 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
114. Id. §§ 1301-1330.
[Vol. 54
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 4 [1989], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss4/2
RHETORIC AND RETRENCHMENT
temporary farmers were ineligible for Chapter 13 because of debt ceilings
of $100,000 for unsecured claims and $350,000 for secured claims." 5 In
addition, Chapter 13 precludes corporations," 6 and not only agri-business
but also genuine family farms are frequently incorporated. Chapter 11,117
the final option for bankrupt farmers prior to enactment of Chapter 12,
was perhaps the preferred option of farmers hoping to keep the farm, but
it also is fraught with difficulties. Chapter 11 is time-consuming and
expensive, it extends to creditors significant power to block reorganization
plans, and it can even lead to involuntary liquidations." 8
Members of Congress began responding to the agricultural crisis and
the inadequacy of existing bankruptcy options in 1985. In the House,
proponents of new legislation envisioned raising debt limits in Chapter 13
for farmers and also giving farmers more time to submit plans and make
payments under plans." 9 In the Senate, farm-block Senators proposed an
entirely new bankruptcy chapter,120 an idea partially inspired by a prototype
submitted by North Carolina Bankruptcy Judges Small and Moore.' 2' De-
spite Senator Helms' objections,'2 the Chapter 12 bill passed the Senate
easily and then prevailed over House legislation in conference.' 23 According
to the Conference Committee, the new law gave "family farmers facing
bankruptcy a fighting chance to reorganize their debts and keep their
land." 24 The House and Senate adopted the Conference Report in early
October, 19861 and President Reagan signed Chapter 12 into law on October
27, 1986.
The ease with which the conferees agreed and the speed with which
Congress acted are testimony to the continuing vitality of American agrarian
ideology. Chapter 12-as a new and full chapter specifically for farmers-
might even be seen as the most excessive outburst of agrarianism in American
bankruptcy law to date. But, at the same time, the initial legislation itself
incorporates perspectives and modifications that earlier bankruptcy law
drafters and judges adopted only after struggle and reconsideration. Farming
is still close to the American heart, even though only a small percentage
115. Id. § 109(e).
116. Chapter 13 is available only to an individual with regular income. See
id. §§ 1301-1331.
117. Id. §§ 1101-1174.
118. Comment, The New Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code: A More
Efficient Approach for Family Farmer Reorganization, 57 Miss. L.J. 185, 185-86
(1987).
119. Note, An Analysis of the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, 15
HoFsTRA L. REv. 353, 367 (1987).
120. Aiken, Chapter 12 Family Farmer Bankruptcy, 66 NEB. L. REv. 632,
668 (1987).
121. Note, supra note 119, at 369.
122. 132 CONG. REc. S3,529, S5,618 (1986).
123. Id. at H8,986, H8,991-94.
124. Id. at H8,999.
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of Americans actually work as farmers and the tenor of American life is
overwhelmingly urban. But Americans and their elected officials have also
developed a penchant for quantitative measurement and managerial caution,
and this penchant cuts against the easy and confident conceptualizations
of farming which were dominant a century ago.
The best example of this change within bankruptcy law concerns the
issue of who is a farmer for purposes of Chapter 12, an issue discussed
with reference to involuntary bankruptcy in the first section of this Article.
While turn-of-the-century judges had little statutory guidance in determining
who was a farmer for purposes of protection against involuntary pro-
ceedings, the drafters of Chapter 12 benefited from an intervening refine-
ment. Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act, the definition of a farmer
became more precise and quantitative; 15 the definition of a farmer became
a "person that received more than 80 percent of such person's gross income
during the taxable year of such person immediately preceding the taxable
year of such person during which the case under this title concerning such
person was commenced from a farming operation owned or operated by
such person.' 26 The 80 percent requirement replaced the prior "principal
part of income test" and undoubtedly allowed farmers, lawyers and judges
to determine with greater confidence who was a farmer. However, several
commentators noted that the great majority of American farmers could
not meet the 80 percent test because of off-farm income. 27 Agri-businesses,
meanwhile, were able to find shelter from involuntary proceedings quite
routinely, 28 especially since the 1978 legislation, unlike preceding legislation,
used the term "person" rather than the phrase "individual personally
engaged in" when defining farmer. In keeping with other long-standing
prescriptions of the bankruptcy law, a "person" may be not only an
individual but also a partnership, a corporation and even a multinational
conglomerate. 29
Congress might have accepted these definitions when drafting Chapter
12, but the goal was to protect genuine family farmers rather than to
provide still another protection for sprawling and faceless agri-business.
Hence, Congress, for purposes of Chapter 12, legally defined the term
"family farmer" and also provided a legally concomitant notion of a
"farming operation."' 130 Congress also developed both an income and a
125. See Marsh, Farmers' Exemption from Involuntary Bankruptcy, 15 U.C.C.
L.J. 162 (1982); Pearson, Is a Man Out Standing in His Field a Farmer for
Bankruptcy Purposes?, 5 J. AoRic. TAx'N & L. 305 (1984).
126. 11 U.S.C. § 101(17) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
127. Note, supra note 119, at 358; see also Kunkel, Farmers' Relief Under
the Bankruptcy Code: Preserving the Farmers' Property, 29 S.D.L. Rv. 303, 304
(1984).
128. Marsh, supra note 125, at 166-67.
129. 11 U.S.C. § 101(35) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
130. Id. § 101(17), (20).
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debt test for the new Chapter. To make the Chapter available even in
light of significant off-farm income, Congress stipulated that only 50 percent
of the gross income from the preceding year need come from the farming
operation. 31 In addition, not less than 80 percent of the debts must arise
from the farming operation and the aggregate debt must not exceed $1.5
million. 32 The magnitude of the latter figure might at first give one pause,
but the financial dimensions of even family-operated farms have changed
radically in recent decades. Indeed, creditors contesting a Chapter 12 filing
routinely attempt to show that a farmer's debts exceed $1.5 million, and
frequently succeed. Farmers, in turn, may preserve their Chapter 12 option
by paying off one or more of their debts in order to get beneath the debt
ceiling and then waiting out the preference period before filing. 33
What about family farms which conduct their operations as partnerships
or corporations? While Congress intended the $1.5 million debt limit to
eliminate the truly huge agri-businesses, Congress also recognized that the
modern farming family has often legally redefined itself via a formal
partnership agreement or incorporation. Hence, farming partnerships or
corporations may qualify for Chapter 12 if more than 50 percent of the
equity or stock is held by one family or relatives of the family conducting
the farm business and if there is no public trading of stock. '34 With such
an operation, the standard debt limitations apply, that is, 80 percent of
the debts must arise from the farming operation, and the debt as a whole
may not exceed the $1.5 million figure. 35
While these definitions of farming and standards for Chapter 12 eli-
gibility in their multidirectional quantitativeness constitute in and of them-
selves a retrenchment from unbridled rhetoric, an expanding case law adds
refinement. Law review articles surveying and cataloguing this case law
will no doubt appear, 36 but for purposes of this Article, a brief sketch
of its major factors will suffice. One line of cases has wrestled with the
definition of a "family farmer," a new characterization created by Chapter
12. The chief question in this line of cases concerns the nature of the
"farming operation" which demonstrates that a party is indeed a "family
farmer."' 13 7 A court, in this regard, might see a kennel or a game farm
as a "farming operation," but view custom harvesting or training show
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Pelzer, Chapter 12: A One-Year Assessment of the New Farm Bankruptcy
Law, AGas FiNANcE, Nov. 1987, at 52, 54.
134. 11 U.S.C. § 101(17)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
135. Id. § 101(17)(B)(ii).
136. See Note, Chapter 12 After the First Year: An Analysis of the Issues,
27 WAsHBuRN L.J. 495, 506-12 (1988) (contains discussion of the emerging case
law).
137. Id. at 507; see also Wilder, Some Observations on the Chapter 12 "Family
Farmer" Concept, AGRic. L. UPDATE, Feb. 1988, at 4.
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horses, by contrast, as outside the scope of Chapter 12.138 Related lines
of cases have spoken to the income and debt requirements set forth by
the Code. Few appellate opinions exist concerning the requirement that 50
percent of the gross income from the preceding year derive from the
farming operation.139 However, a larger and more coherent case law con-
cerning the debt limits has emerged. Tentative commentaries suggest that
courts considering the debt criteria for Chapter 12 eligibility have adopted
a "totality-of-the-circumstances evaluation" specific to the case at hand in
determining which debts arise from the farming operation. 40
Resting on eligibility, of course, is the entire edifice of Chapter 12.
Compared to other contemporary bankruptcy options, Chapter 12 most
resembles Chapter 13. The debtor in each chapter remains in possession
of his or her property and devises a court-approved plan which pays a
portion of the debts in light of available disposable income. In each chapter,
creditors may not force the debtor to involuntarily submit a plan, and
creditors also do not have the power to vote the plan up or down. Despite
these basic similarities, however, Chapter 12 and 13 are not carbon copies.
Chapter 12 has a much higher debt limit, to wit, $1.5 million as compared
to the total of $450,000 from secured and unsecured debts under Chapter
13. Chapter 12 gives the debtor a longer time to file a plan,' 4' and it also
does not incorporate the three to five year limit on repaying secured claims
which is a feature of Chapter 13.142 All of these features make Chapter
12 significantly more appealing than Chapter 13 for many distressed farmers.
Even more appealing to farmers are the ways in which Chapter 12:
(1) reduces the debtor's burden of providing adequate protection to the
undersecured creditor during the initial stay; and (2) allows the debtor to
"write down" the farm mortgage to the value of the property. In the
former case, Chapter 12 explicitly eliminates the obligation to pay lost
opportunity costs. 43 The debtor may adequately protect the creditor by
paying "the reasonable rent customary in the community where the property
is located, based upon rental value, net income and earning capacity of
the property."' 144 This is particularly desirable when, in a period of declining
farmland values, many farmers simply cannot pay lost post-petition in-
138. Martin, Chapter 12 After Almost One Year in the Bankruptcy Courts,
37 DRAKE L. REv. 211, 215, 215 n.19 (1987).
139. See In re Rott, 73 Bankr. 366 (1987-88).
140. Kershen, Chapter 12 and Debts Arising from a Farming Operation,
Aoiuc. L. UPDATE, June 1988, at 4.
141. A Chapter 13 debtor has only 15 days to file a plan, but a farmer
proceeding in Chapter 12 has 90 days. 11 U.S.C. § 1221 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
142. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
143. Id. § 1205(a).
144. Id. § 1205(b)(3). For a discussion of the Chapter 12 approach to adequate
protection, see Ryan, supra note 111.
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terest.' 45 The "write down" option in Chapter 12146 allows the debtor to
reduce the secured debt to the current appraised value of the security. The
adequate protection and "write down" provisions have prompted .several
commentators to compare Chapter 12 to the Frazier-Lemke Acts.147
There is little evidence that Congress itself considered Chapter 12 a
latter-day version of the Frazier-Lemke Act. 48 However, Professor James
J. White, the most influential academic commentator to have addressed
Chapter 12, argues convincingly that Frazier-Lemke rulings effectively in-
sulate Chapter 12 from any sweeping invalidation on constitutional grounds. 49
The previously discussed Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust
Bank of Roanoke5 ° and its most important progeny 5 ' appear to give
mortgagees protection only at a level of appraised value; a "taking" of
value above that as, for example, through a Chapter 12 plan will apparently
be tolerable.
Given the complexity and relative innovativeness of Chapter 12, it is
perhaps too early to appraise its effectiveness. However, a large number
of farmers are prepared to use Chapter 12.152 Perhaps more significantly,
Chapter 12 has apparently given farmers more leverage in informal ne-
gotiations regarding their indebtedness. 15 Farmers in effect possess Chapter
12 as an ultimate trump card, and banks and other lenders are more willing
to provide and accept arrangements favorable to farmers. In particular,
creditors are (1) accepting shared-appreciation agreements under which the
debt being serviced is reduced to the value of the real estate and the parties
share in any subsequent increase in value, (2) approving interest rate
reductions which enable farmers to meet operating expenses and make
145. Ryan, supra note 111, at 337.
146. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). For a discussion of the
"write down" provision, see Comment, supra note 118, at 198.
147. See Hahn, Chapter 12-The Long Road Back, 66 NEB. L. REv. 726,
728 (1987); Ryan, supra note 111, at 338; Note, supra note 136, at 496.
148. Judge Small made a passing reference to the Frazier-Lemke Act during
his testimony before a Congressional subcommittee, but James J. White has said
comparisons to the Frazier-Lemke Act were for the most part "carefully avoided."
White, Taking From Farm Lenders and Farm Debtors: Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy
Code, 13 J. CoRP. L. 1, 4 n.7 (1987).
149. Id. at 2.
150. Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
151. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273 (1940).
152. Bankruptcy Judge Martin of the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Western District of Wisconsin reports that in the north central region of the
United States (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota and Wisconsin) 2,728 Chapter 12
petitions were filed during the ten months following enactment. Martin, supra note
138, at 211 n.3. Judge Martin characterizes the number of filings as "staggering."
Id. at 211.
153. Bromley, The Effects of the Chapter 12 Legislation on Informed Res-
olution of Farm Debt Problems, 37 DRA.uE L. REv. 197, 197 (1987-88).
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interest payments, and (3) tolerating the surrender of real estate which is
surplus to the actual farming and crediting the farmer's account for the
value of the surplus real estate.1 4 Indeed, Chapter 12 provides not only
an incentive for creditors but also a gauge by which debtors and creditors
might measure proposed debt restructurings.
For purposes at hand, reactions to Chapter 12 and its ramifications
are as intriguing as Chapter 12 itself. On one extreme, a Nebraska lawyer
has praised Chapter 12 as "a viable option for those family farmers who
desire to stay on the farm, work hard, and take the long road back to
increased income, equity, and a better way of life."' 55 On the other extreme,
the venerated but crotchety White, echoing his proud' commitment to
personal property security, 15 6 has suggested that Chapter 12 may be restated
as follows: "It shall be a violation of the law for a creditor to take a
mortgage on the value of a farm in excess of the value found by bankruptcy
court."' 5 7 White also vigorously criticizes possible efficiency-oriented, pa-
ternalistic and moralistic justifications for the legislation,' 8 finally con-
cluding that Chapter 12 is designed primarily to accomplish a redistribution
of wealth by taking money from creditors and giving it to debtors. 59 This
conclusion mystifies White because the legislation was "fostered by two
Republican Senators, one an arch conservative, passed by a Republican
Senate, and signed by a conservative President."'' 6 "In Chapter 12," White
says with his head shaking, "we have a depression bill taking money out
of the pockets of the creditors and putting it into the pockets of the
debtors, fostered and signed by those who are thought to represent the
creditors' interest.''161
What White failed to grasp is what this Article has demonstrated: The
agrarianism of the American dominant ideology is not political-party based,
but rather is a vital, potent mythology which can have impact on bankruptcy
law. Such an impact is possible in any period, but it is particularly likely
in periods of economic stress for the farmer or for the country generally.
Hence, we have in our law farmer bankruptcy provisions enacted during
the conservative "Reagan Revolution" which in several important ways
resemble farmer bankruptcy provisions enacted during the liberal insurgency
of the 1930s. This is politically incongruent unless one understands the
154. Id. at 198.
155. Hahn, supra note 147, at 733.
156. White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37 VAmD.
L. REv. 473 (1984).
157. White, supra note 148, at 17. For a direct response to White, see Bauer,
Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit: A Response to Professor White's
Sortie Against Chapter 12, 13 J. CoRP. L. 33 (1987).
158. White, supra note 148, at 17-22.
159. Id. at 22-29.
160. Id. at 30.
161. Id. at 31.
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power of American agrarianism to cross party lines and to jump the
perceived divide between conservatism and liberalism.
Chapter 12 also shares with the Frazier-Lemke Acts and the original
1898 Act certain tensions and tendencies. From its enactment in 1986,
Chapter 12 has included refined and elaborate quantitative definitions of
the farmer as well as constitutionally inspired restraints. It also contains
a sunset provision, 162 and the trend in the emerging case law in the "farming
operation" area and others is to disdain bold, unbridled rhetoric. While
imbued with and in large part prompted by modern American agrarianism,
Chapter 12 from the outset and in increasingly evident ways also manifests
the reccurring pattern of rhetoric and retrenchment that has historically
reigned in farmer-related bankruptcy law.
CONCLUSION
Provisions giving special attention and treatment to farmers have been
a part of the American Bankruptcy Code for over ninety years. The first
of these provisions barred involuntary farmer bankruptcy and remains a part
of the law today. In addition, special extensions and foreclosure moratoria
for farmers were added to the law in the 1930s, and although these provisions
have expired, they, in a sense, served as prototypes for the modem Chapter
12, an entire bankruptcy proceeding available only to farmers. No one relishes
bankruptcy, but more so than any other sector of the American population,
farmers receive special treatment in the law of bankruptcy.
To a certain extent, the special standing of farmers in American bankruptcy
law can be understood with reference to the unpredictable, precarious nature
of farming as an economic enterprise. But thoughtful appraisals of farming's
risks and pitfalls and concomitant policy determinations do not alone explain
the history and present form of bankruptcy legislation concerning farmers.
Of equal and, indeed, more importance is the long-standing valorization of
the farmer in the dominant American ideology. If understood with this factor
in mind, the forms of farmer-related bankruptcy considered in this Article
grow more distinctive. The 1898 prohibition of involuntary farmer bankruptcies
was a general favoring of especially respected Americans. The Frazier-Lemke
Acts of the Great Depression constituted truly special protections for sym-
bolically important, arguably prototypical Americans in a period of national
crisis. The current Chapter 12 amounts to nervous protection for what might
be a vanishing breed; it constitutes a group-specific balkanization of the
Bankruptcy Code. Ideology infused farmer-related bankruptcy law, and it
continues to provide its conceptual subtleties.
The interrelationship of agrarian ideology and bankruptcy law has never
been static. In each of three historical periods explored in this Article, the
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initial rhetorical entry and manifestation of agrarianism has been followed
by judicial and legislative retrenchment. There is, in other words, a recognizable
pattern within the legal-ideological area, and this pattern appears in different
historical periods, albeit with somewhat variable specifics. The pattern of
rhetoric and retrenchment, of course, is hardly a binding rule for farmer-
related bankruptcy law, much less for other areas, but the pattern illustrates
that the interrelationship of ideology and law itself is dynamic. Agrarianism
infuses bankruptcy law, but that infusion is only part of a more complicated
pattern.
What is the future of farmer-related American bankruptcy law? As recent
calls to extend Chapter 12 beyond 1993 suggest, 63 a crisp and final break
between agrarianism and bankruptcy law is unlikely in the near future. The
agrarianism of the dominant ideology is-grudgingly, haltingly and ever so
slowly-in decline, and a newer belief in quantitativeness, efficiency and
expertise cuts against it. The genuine family farm is disappearing and declining
in economic significance, and at some point this structural change will pre-
sumably affect both agrarianism itself and its infusion into bankruptcy law.
However, for the time being, farmers maintain both their shield against
involuntary bankruptcy and the Chapter 12 option, and additional efforts to
protect farmers through bankruptcy law are conceivable. When these efforts
are launched, one can expect the pattern of rhetoric and retrenchment to
reemerge.
Outside the areas of farmer-related bankruptcy law and bankruptcy law
generally, the interrelationships of ideology and law deserve further attention.
Important work has distinguished the various levels on which law might be
said to have an ideological character,'6 but the study of ideology's impact
on law is in an early stage. Beyond farming, certain other elements of the
dominant American ideology-hard work, Old Glory, veterans, the family-
are highly valorized. Law is never separate and distinct from ideology, but
legislation and case law related to these elements is likely to be particularly
rhetorical. Raising this phenomenon to the level of consciousness facilitates
either supporting or opposing legal change. Additionally, even with law related
to traditionally valorized elements, ideological input is hardly routine and
static, and recognizing patterns of rhetoric and retrenchment as well as other
shifts is illuminating. Lawmakers and critical commentators cannot step fully
outside of ideology, but they can more consciously and intelligently appreciate
patterns of ideological and legal interaction.
163. Aiken, supra note 120, at 632; Note, supra note 136, at 525.
164. Ideological elements are present in the substance of legislation, in the
legal form in which the legislation is cast and in the way substance and form of
particular legislation are parts of the norms and premises of the overall legal system.
Hunt, supra note 5, at 32.
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